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THE RENAISSANCE OF GOOD FAITH

IN CONTRACTING IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW
Ralph A. Newmanf
Chafee has said that the law is from one point of view like a great,
partially unexplored continent that judges are gradually mapping out
by their decisions.' Sometimes the paths are marked out by judicial
decisions in advance of social change; such advances are always tentative until they gain general acceptance. Sometimes the direction of new
paths is determined by social changes. In either case, the decisions become established legal doctrine only when decisional advances and
social approval are in approximate balance. When society delays its
approval of judicial advances, further acceptance of new doctrine is
retarded.
The tentative advances of decisional law beyond the traditional
common law requirements of good faith in the negotiation and enforcement of contracts have encountered the not unusual reluctance
of law to abandon its accustomed approaches. Advances in this area of
law have also encountered an unusual kind of resistance which stems
not from lack of recognition of the desirability of more elevated standards of good faith in contracting, but largely from the historical
distinction between the ethical standards required at law and in
equity. The English Court of Chancery was established because the
common law courts administered law according to extremely low
standards of moral values. Now that judges drawn from lay backgrounds
have become as moral as those who wore ecclesiastical robes, the distinction has lost its significance.
It is difficult in a pluralistic legal system to pinpoint the time
when change in judicial decision is to be equated with change in doctrine. When decisional change has taken place in some jurisdictions
but acceptance of the change is still incomplete, it becomes especially
hazardous, without assuming oracular powers, to describe the state of
the general law. What can safely be said in connection with the probt Professor of Law Hastings College of the Law, University of California. A.B. 1914,
LL.B. 1916, Harvard University.
1 See comments on the theory of law of C.J. Stonore, Blackstone, and Beale, in
Chafee, Do Judges Make or Discover Law?, 91 PROC. Ar. PHIL. Soc. 405, 406 (1947). Cf.
9
Devlin, L.J., dissenting, in United Engineering Workers v. Devanayangam, [1 68] A.C.
856, 384, [1967] 2 All E.R. 367, 381 (P.C. 1967) (Ceylon) (equity is an illustration of making
new law).
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lem of good faith in the negotiation and enforcement of contracts is
that the law, if it has not already changed, is at the point of change.
The winds of change have at least raised a corner of the moral curtain
that, heavy with the mold of centuries, still hangs across our law, cutting off from the main body of the law the benefit of the system of
moral principles that we call equity.
If we begin our analysis by considering the traditional common
law doctrine, the conclusion is unavoidable that the Anglo-American
legal system is the only important system other than Islamic law incorporating the doctrine that contracts unfairly obtained or unfairly
pressed for performance will be enforced in damages. Corbin said that
in granting or refusing a decree in equity,
[A] greater variety of facts is to be taken into consideration than is
the case in an action for damages for breach of contract.... Among
these facts are the public interest, oppression and sharp practice
in the formation of the contract, inadequacy of consideration,
2
[and] mistake even though unilateral in character ....
Dawson has expressed the opinion that "[i]n contract cases, as in other
equity cases, higher standards of fairness and morality are regularly
employed." 3 In equity the duty to reveal information in the course
of the bargaining process is recognized in a great many situations in
which the failure to disclose would not require denial of damages for
breach of contract. Traditional doctrine recognizes that a plaintiff will
be allowed to recover damages even though the contract was obtained
through means that would be deemed so unfair as to require a denial
of specific performance.4 Kent in his Commentaries said:
There are many duties that belong to the class of imperfect obligations which are binding on conscience, but which human laws
do not, and cannot undertake directly to enforce. But when the aid
of a court of equity is sought to carry into execution such a contract, then the principles of ethics have a more extensive sway; and
a purchase made with such a reservation of superior knowledge,
would be of too sharp a character to be aided and forwarded in its
execution by the powers of the Court of Chancery. 5
Story has said that:
An agreement to be entitled to be carried into specific performance ought . . .to be certain, fair and just in all its parts .
2 5A A. CORBiN, CoNmcrTS § 1136, at 96 (1964).
3 Dawson, Specific Performance in France and Germany, 57 MicH. L. REv. 495, 535
(1959).
4 Cuff v. Dorland, 55 Barb. 481 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1870).
5 2 J. KENT, CoMlmmRTAlms 490 (12th ed. 1873).
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Courts of Equity will not decree a specific performance in cases
of fraud or mistake;

gains ....

6

.

. .

or of hard and unconscionable bar-

Pomeroy wrote that:
If.. . the contract itself is unfair, one-sided, unjust, unconscionable, or affected by any other inequitable feature; or if its enforcement would be oppressive or hard on the defendant,.., or if the
plaintiff has obtained [the agreement] by sharp and unscrupulous
practices, by overreaching, by trickery, by taking undue advantage
of his position, by non-disclosure of material facts, or by any other
unconscientious means,--then a specific performance will be refused.7
Since the fourth century before the birth of Christ, when a Persian
king could say that the Greek market was a place where men could
cheat one another under oath, there has been a steady enlargement of
relief for unfairness in contracting. Until the end of the classical period
of Roman law, there was no relief for fraud except in special cases
involving minors and wards. Relief was introduced into praetorian
equity by the actio exceptio doli;8 and when the praetorian equity became integrated into the jus civile in the reign of Hadrian, the doctrine of good faith in contracting became a part of the general law. In
early common law, fraudulent misrepresentations other than those
going to the factum were not recognized as a defense at law.9 In 1804
a seller was not liable for misdescription unless the article was warranted. 10 Rescission for innocent misrepresentations is a modern doctrine.1 In English law innocent misrepresentations were recognized as
a defense in equity in 1810,12 and are now recognized as a defense at
law in executory contracts,' 3 although they were not recognized as a
defense in actions for damages after the contract had been executed 14
0 2 J. STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 769, at 90 (13th ed. 1886).
7 4 J. POMEROY, EQurry JURISPRUDENCE § 1405a (5th ed. 1941).
8 W. BUCKLAND, A TE xBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 415-16 (3d ed. 1963). See also P. STEIN,

59 (1958). The
reference to Cyrus' castigation of the morals of Greek merchants is taken from H.
MULLER, THE Loom OF HISTORY 15 (1958).
FAULT IN THE FORMATION OF CONTRACT IN ROMAN LAW AND ScoTs LAW

9 W. PROSSER, TORTS § 100, at 704 (3d ed. 1964).
10 Seixas v. Woods, 2 Cai. R. 48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804).
11 See 5 S.WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1500 (rev. ed. 1937), and cases cited id. n1. In

Smith v. Richards, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 26 (1839) (Story, J., dissenting), rescission was allowed
by treating mistaken representations as fraud and warranty. See also PRossm, supra note

9, § 103, at 735-36.
12 Cadman v. Homer, 18 Ves. Jr. 10, 34 Eng. Rep. 221 (Rolls Ct. 1810).
'3 C. CHESHIRE & C. FIPOOT, LAW OF CONTRACT 238 (6th ed. 1964).

14 Seddon v. North Eastern Salt Co., 19 05] 1 Ch. 326, 333 (1904).
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until 1967.15 Since 181716 knowledge of material mistake has been accepted in the United States as a defense at law1'7 as well as in equity.
8
In 1932 the doctrine was adopted in the Restatement of Contracts.'
Although the Restatement limits relief to mistake in basic assumptions,
decisions both before and since the adoption of the doctrine in the
Restatement have often granted relief even for collateral mistake. 19
The acceptance of the equitable doctrine of good faith has been
sporadic, and in 1857 Parsons could say truthfully that English law,
although it forbade a man to cheat another, would let him cheat himself.20 This is still true in England as to transactions concerning real
property. 21 In the United States unconscionable conduct short of
fraud was seldom accepted as a defense to claims for damages until
after 1930,22 and only in scattered instances until 1950.23
In Kent's time the reception in common law of the equitable
concept of good faith was still halting and imperfect. The distinction
drawn by Kent between the moral standards of equity and common
law expressed his disapproval of the rudimentary standards of good
faith in contracting that still prevailed at common law. The same
15 Misrepresentation Act, 1967, c. 7, § 2.

16 Gillespie v. Moon, 2 Johns. Ch. 585 (N.Y. 1817).
17 Cohen v. Citizens' Bank, 143 Cal. App. 2d 480, 300 P.2d 14 (Ct. App. 1956) (action
for deceit); R.O. Bromagin & Co. v. City of Bloomington, 234 Ill. 114, 84 N.E. 700 (1908);
Baltimore v. DeLuca-Davis Constr. Co., 210 Md. 518, 124 A.2d 557 (1956); Scottsbluff School
Dist. v. Olson, 153 Neb. 451, 45 N.W.2d 164 (1950); Margraf v. Muir, 57 N.Y. 155 (1874);
Gillespie v. Moon, 2 Johns. Ch. 585 (N.Y. 1817) (Kent, C.); Rushlight Automatic Sprinkler
Co. v. City of Portland, 189 Ore. 194, 219 P.2d 732 (1950).
18 RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs § 472(b) (1932).
19 Moffett, Hodgkins & Clarke Co. v. Rochester, 178 U.S. 373 (1900) (mistake in bid
for public work); McCarty v. Anderson, 58 So. 2d 255 (La. Ct. App. 1952) (strip of dry
land excluded by vendor, without purchaser's knowledge, from land sold which was, in
general, swampy); Kutsche v. Ford, 222 Mich. 442, 192 N.W. 714 (1923) (mistake in bid
for public work); Richardson Lumber Co. v. Hoey, 219 Mich. 643, 648-50, 189 N.W. 923,
925 (1922) (underground fires burning close to railroad ties sold; treated as mistake by
purchaser as to safety of the ties); St. Nicholas Church v. Kropp, 135 Minn. 115, 160 N.W.
500 (1916) (mistake in bid for private construction); O'Shea v. Morris, 112 Neb. 102, 104,
198 N.W. 866, 867 (1924) (vendor failed to inform purchaser that a driveway was not
wholly on the property sold); Brown v. Lamphear, 35 Vt. 252 (1862) (land sold contained a
spring, by mistake of the vendor, who needed the spring for his retained land); Donaldson
v. Abraham, 68 Wash. 208, 122 P. 1003 (1912) (mistake in addition in bid for public work).
20 1 T. PARSoNs, CONTRACrS 461 (3d ed. 1857); see 5 WILUSrON, supra note 11, § 1497.
21 See A. GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND MoRAL LAw 119 (1953).
22 See Annot., 65 A.L.R. 7, 86 (1980). United States v. Hume, 132 U.S. 406 (1889),
reviews cases involving the effect of unconscionable contracts at law.
23 See Comment, Policing Contracts Under the Proposed Commercial Code, 18 U.
CHI. L. RF-v. 146, 149 (1950).
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antithesis that was so sharply and uncritically drawn by Kent, Story,
and Pomeroy is repeated in contemporary judicial opinions because of
a failure to recognize the extent of the absorption of equitable concepts
that has taken place since these jurists' time. A Michigan court has
said that "a court of equity will not decree specific performance of a
contract in favor of a party merely because he is not guilty of suffi' 24
cient fraud or deceit to constitute a legal defense to the contract.
Transposed into a comparison which approaches the problem from
the viewpoint of the effect of such conduct in an action for damages,
we would find the court saying that although a party is guilty of
sufficient fraud or deceit to constitute a defense to a suit for specific
performance, he may nevertheless recover damages sufficient to place
him in the same position as if the contract had been carried out.
Refusal to so charge would constitute reversible error. No such explicit
charge has been found in any book of instructions to juries, nor in any
reported case, probably for the reason that any such charge would
invite retaliation by an outraged jury in the form of a denial of substantial damages. A Pennsylvania court recently repeated the distinction, saying that "the chancellor may relegate a party to his remedy
at law if in the exercise of a reasonable discretion the chancellor believes that specific performance of a contract is contrary to equity and
justice." 25
Statements to this effect have been repeated for many years without speculation as to whether the same elevated moral standards that
are enforced in equity might not be equally appropriate in actions for
damages, so as to preclude recovery at law for breach of contracts obtained by unfair means. The Restatement of Contracts has uncritically
accepted the distinction in the treatment of unfair conduct at law
20
and in equity.
It seems probable that the doctrine that a plaintiff who seeks
specific relief is held to a stricter standard of conduct than one who
seeks damages no longer represents the actual state of Anglo-American
law. The doctrine, formulated almost three hundred years ago, that
specific performance may be denied for improper conduct that will
not bar relief in damages, 2 7 has persisted only because of the major fault
in the structure of Anglo-American law, the dichotomy between law
24 Wayne Woods Land Co. v. Beeman, 211 Mich. 360, 364, 178 N.W. 696, 697 (1920).
25 Barr v. Deiter, 190 Pa. Super. 454, 459, 154 A.2d 290, 293 (1959).
26 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 367, comment a (1932).
27 Anonymous, 2 Ch. Cas. 17, 22 Eng. Rep. 825 (1679).
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and equity. Since the contract, even though it is not enforceable specifically, is left unimpaired, the remedy of damages is still available,
according to the traditional doctrine. But to deny specific performance
and to allow damages is an inadequate solution of the problem, because
in many cases the effect of a judgment for damages may cause equally
extreme hardship to the defendant. 28 It may be that all that is necessary
is for the courts to make explicit the integration of equitable doctrine
that has already occurred.
There is a dearth of authority as to what happens when a plaintiff
who has been denied specific performance seeks to recover damages.
Unless the trial judge writes an opinion or unless an appeal is taken
from his decision, the published reports will not disclose the result of
the subsequent proceedings. The absence of authority may also be due
to failure to prosecute the claim for damages. Many causes may have
contributed to this lacuna in the law: apprehension that the claimant
will fare no better at the hands of a judge or jury in his claim for
damages than he did in his attempt to obtain a decree for specific
performance; sheer emotional or financial exhaustion of the claimant;
or the difficulty of proving damages. In land contracts the purchase
price is generally equivalent to the market value, and no substantial
damages can be proved. If, on the other hand, the disparity between
purchase price and market value is great, which is usually the case in
catching bargains, the inadequacy of the consideration might raise
a presumption of fraud which would preclude relief in either specific
performance or damages. 29 Modem restrictions on the permissible
latitude for dealers' talk3" and recognition of the right to rescission for
innocent misrepresentations 3' may have discouraged further litigation
of the claim for damages. In cases of sharp practice, mistake so induced
will of necessity be known or recognizable, and the doctrine that
knowledge of a serious mistake makes the contract voidable, 32 a
doctrine that has been extended in many decisions to mistake in
collateral matters, 33 may have an important influence on an evaluation
28 See Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 26-27 (1950); Garvey, Some Aspects of
the Merger of Law and Equity, 10 CATH. U.L. REV. 59 (1961).
29 Lord Eldon, in Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. Jr. 234, 246, 32 Eng. Rep. 592, 597 (Ch.
1804); Lord Hardwicke, in Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sr. 125, 155, 28 Eng.
Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750); McClintock, Mistake and the ContractualInterests, 28 MINN. L.
REv. 460 (1944).
30 Kabatchnick v. Hanover-Elm Bldg. Corp., 328 Mass. 341, 103 N.E.2d 692 (1952).
31 See authorities cited note 11 supra.
32 See cases cited note 17 supra.
33 See cases cited note 19 supra.
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of the prospects for success in recovering damages. It is not unlikely
that the modern practice in most jurisdictions of allowing the same
judge who denied specific performance to pass upon the subsequent
claim for damages may discourage the hope for a favorable result at law
more than did the former practice of holding another trial for this determination before a different judge.34
Since the traditional doctrine was first announced nearly three
hundred years ago, only two cases have been found in which damages
have actually been awarded after a denial of specific performance for
unconscionable conduct short of fraud. In one of these cases, decided
in 1874, the judgment was set aside on appeal on the ground that
damages had been calculated on the wrong basis.3 5 The other case was
an action for specific performance brought by a vendor who had failed
to reveal the presence of an underground watercourse which, since it
was a natural right and not an easement, did not make the title unmarketable. The court refused specific performance but also held that
the purchaser was not entitled to the return of his down payment,
since the contract was enforceable at law.3 6 Of forty-one cases that have
been found in which specific performance was denied for sharp practice
without rescinding the contract,3 7 only seven were decided within the
34 See 30 YALE L.J. 506, 509 & n.11 (1920). A questionnaire circulated at the request
of the writer among state trial judges who attended sessions of the National College of
State Trial Judges in July and August 1968 produced the following information concerning the views and experience of the Judges on the question whether or not a court should
grant damages for breach of a contract obtained by such sharp practices as to preclude
granting specific performance:
Jurisdictions represented
44
Replies received
176
Preference expressed for refusing damages
163
Preference expressed for granting damages
10
Unreported cases raising the problem
187
Cases in which damages were refused
187
Cases in which damages were granted
0
35 Margraf v. Muir, 57 N.Y. 155, 159 (1874). The proper measure of damages in the
case of an executory contract in New York was return of the down payment. When the
seller of land is suing, the measure of damages is the full purchase price, a result
which, as Chafee pointed out in his Cooley Lectures (see note 28 supra), gives the vendor
exactly the relief he would be denied in equity.
30 Kleinberg v. Ratett, 252 N.Y. 236, 169 N.E. 289 (1929).
37 Anonymous, 2 Ch. Cas. 17, 22 Eng. Rep. 825 (1679); Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves.
Sr. 125, 28 Eng. Rep. 82 (Ch. 1750); How v. Weldon, 2 Ves. Sr. 516, 28 Eng. Rep. 330
(Rolls Ct. 1754); Day v. Newman, 2 Cox Ch. 77, 30 Eng. Rep. 36 (Rolls Ct. 1788); Campbell
v. Spencer, 11 Pa. 129, 133 (1809); Gillespie v. Moon, 2 Johns. Ch. 585 (N.Y. 1817); Bean
v. Valle, 2 Mo. 103 (1829) (dicta); Myers v. Watson, I Sim. N.S. 523, 61 Eng. Rep. 202
(Ch. 1851); Falcke v. Gray, 4 Drew. 651, 62 Eng. Rep. 250 (Ch. 1859); Peters v. Delaplaine,
49 N.Y. 362 (1872); Fish v. Leser, 69 Ill. 594 (1873); Sternberger v. McGovern, 56 N.Y. 12
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past thirty years.38 During the same thirty-year period rescission was
granted in two cases on the ground of sharp practice;3 9 of these two
cases, one was decided in 1959.40 The traditional distinction was reiterated in a hard bargain case decided in 1967,41 and, although the
defense of unclean hands is a general principle running through
damage actions as well as suits for specific relief, 42 there are still cases
of this kind in which the distinction has been repeated during the past
decade. 43 It should be remembered, however, in evaluating these cases,
that in the hard bargain situation there is no deception of the defendant, and in the unclean hands situation the unfairness is directed
(1874); Fitzpatrick v. Dorland, 27 Hun 291 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1882); Hetfield v. Willey, 105 Ill.
286 (1883); Byars v. Stubbs, 85 Ala. 256, 4 So. 755 (1888); Mansfield v. Sherman, 81 Me.
365, 17 A. 300 (1889); Chute v. Quincy, 156 Mass. 189, 30 N.E. 550 (1892); Wollums v.
Horsley, 93 Ky. 582, 20 S.W. 781 (1892); Kelley v. York Cliffs Improvement Co., 94 Me.
374, 47 A. 898 (1900); Moetzel & Muttera v. Koch, 122 Iowa 196, 97 N.W. 1079 (1904);
Miller v. Tjexhus, 20 S.D. 12, 104 N.W. 519 (1905); Banaghan v. Malaney, 200 Mass. 46,
85 N.E. 839 (1908); Koch v. Streuter, 232 Ill. 594, 83 N.E. 1072 (1908); Loosing v.
Loosing, 85 Neb. 66, 122 N.W. 707 (1909); Bartley v. Lindebury, 89 N.J. Eq. 8, 104 A.
333 (Ch. 1918); Costello v. Sykes, 143 Minn. 109, 172 N.W. 907 (1919); McDermott v.
Lindquist, 66 Colo. 88, 179 P. 147 (1919); Wayne Woods Land Co. v. Beeman, 211 Mich.
360, 178 N.W. 696 (1920); Gabrielson v. Hogan, 298 F. 722 (8th Cir. 1924); Wilson v.
Bergmann, 112 Neb. 145, 198 N.W. 671 (1924); Dysarz v. Janczarek, 238 Mich. 529, 213
N.W. 694 (1927); Kleinberg v. Ratett, 252 N.Y. 236, 169 N.E. 289 (1929); Dunlop v. Wever,
209 Iowa 590, 228 N.W. 562 (1930); Hemhauser v. Hemhauser, 110 NJ. Eq. 77, 158 A.
762 (Ch. 1932); Favata v. Mercer, 409 Ill. 271, 99 N.E.2d 116 (1951); Panco v. Rogers, 19
N.J. Super. 12, 87 A.2d 770 (Ch. 1952); Kukulski v. Bolda, 2 Ill. 2d 11, 116 N.E.2d 384
(1954); Miller v. Coffeen, 365 Mo. 204, 210, 280 S.W.2d 100, 103 (1955); Schiff v. Breitenbach, 14 Ill. 2d 611, 153 N.E.2d 549 (1958); Maryland City Realty, Inc. v. Vogts, 238 Md.
290, 208 A.2d 701 (1965); Public Water Supply Dept. v. Fowlkes, 407 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1966).
38 Schiff v. Breitenbach, 14 Ill. 2d 611, 153 N.E.2d 549 (1958); Kukulski v. Bolda,
2 I1. 2d 11, 116 N.E.2d 384 (1954); Favata v. Mercer, 409 Ill. 271, 99 N.E.2d 116 (1951);
Maryland City Realty, Inc. v. Vogts, 238 Md. 290, 208 A.2d 701 (1965); Miller v. Coffeen,
365 Mo. 204, 210, 280 S.W.2d 100, 103 (1955); Public Water Supply Dept. v. Fowlkes, 407
S.W.2d 642 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); Panco v. Rogers, 19 N.J. Super. 12, 87 A.2d 770 (Ch. 1952).
39 Straus v. Madden, 219 Md. 535, 543, 150 A.2d 230, 235 (1950) (the court found bad
faith, but not amounting to fraud); Van Looyengoed v. Allencrest Gardens Corp., 265
Mich. 182, 251 N.W. 317 (1933).
40 Straus v. Madden, 219 Md. 535, 150 A.2d 230 (1959).
41 Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
42 Chafee, Coming into Equity with Clean Hands, 47 MicH. L. R-v. 1065, 1091-92
(1949). "[IThe clean hands maxim is notpeculiar to equity .... " Z. CHAFEE, SOME PRoBLEMs oF EQuITY 94 (1950).
43 Faber v. Landman, 123 So. 2d 405 (Fla. Ct. App. 1960); Spector v. Ahrenholz, 107
So. 2d 34 (Fla. Ct. App. 1958); Feldman v. Urban Commercial Co., 78 N.J. Super. 520, 525,
189 A.2d 467, 470 (Ch. 1963), afftd, 87 N.J. Super. 391, 209 A.2d 640 (App. Div. 1965);
Leathers v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 410 P.2d 541 (Okla. 1965).

1969]

GOOD FAITH IN CONTRACTING

against persons who are not parties to the litigation. Even though the
decisions in these two kinds of cases should on principle reach the
same result as in the sharp practice cases, it cannot be contended that
the decisions refusing rescission in the hard bargain and unclean hands
situations are controlling in situations in which the plaintiff has deceived the defendant. Since 1958 rescission has been granted in three
44
cases of hard bargains.
A parallel development has taken place in the law of sales of goods
through the enactment in almost all states of section 2-302 of the
Uniform Commercial Code,4 5 which authorizes the court to refuse to
enforce unconscionable contracts. 46 The enactment of this provision

constitutes a legislative adoption of the doctrine that the equitable
criterion of fairness in contracting applies to sales of goods whatever
method of enforcement is sought. The extension of the equity of the
statute to all contracts seems inevitable. 47 Another parallel development is the doctrine of relief for frustration, in force in many jurisdictions. 48 Whether the failure of the contractual purpose occurs immediately when a contract induced by sharp practice is made, or later
44 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Ludentes
v. Bliss, 157 Cal. App. 2d 565, 321 P.2d 526 (Ct. App. 1958); American Home Improvement
Co. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964).
45 Except North Carolina, California, and Louisiana. The section was rejected in
California on the ground that it "could result in the renegotiation of contracts in every
case of disagreement." See 37 CAL. B.J. 119, 135-36 (1962). For a refutation of this argument see 63 YALE L.J. 560 (1954). Note that a proposal of some of the drafters of the
Uniform Commercial Code to limit the effect of § 2-802 to denial of specific performance
was defeated. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REvISIONS TO PRoPosED FINAL DRAr No. 2
(May 1951).
46 The statute has already been before the courts. In Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the court stated its complete agreement with
the section and reached the same result at common law, although the Code had not been
adopted in the District of Columbia when the contract in suit was made. The statute was
applied in American Home Improvement Co. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 485, 201 A.2d 886
(1964); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1967);
Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez, 58 Misc. qd 620, 279 N.Y.S.2d 391 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1967);
Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 803 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
47 1 CoRBIN, supra note 2, § 128 n.94: "In any jurisdiction enacting this provision
as to all contracts for the sale of goods, the courts will certainly be influenced by it in
dealing with other contracts."
48 Griel Bros. v. Mabson, 179 Ala. 444, 60 So. 876 (1912); Mineral Park Land Co. v.
Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916); Dailey v. Clark Can Co., 128 Mich. 591, 87 N.W.
761 (1901); Kinzer Constr. Co. v. State, 125 N.Y.S. 46 (Ct. Cl. 1910), aff'd, 204 N.Y. 881,
97 N.E. 871 (1912); Bergstedt v. Bender, 222 S.W. 547 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920); St. Louis
S.W. Ry. v. Johnston, 58 Tex. Civ. App. 639, 125 S.W. 61 (1910). See 6 CORBIN, supra
note 2, § 1353.
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due to unforeseeable future events, would seem to make no significant
difference in determining whether or not relief should be granted, as
long as there has been no serious change in position of the other party.
Insistence on enforcing a contract that has been frustrated by subsequent events is no less selfish than enforcement of a contract that
was made by mistake. Since taking advantage of a known mistake is
fraud, it is impossible logically to deny relief for any mistake, intrinsic
or collateral, as long as the mistake induced the making of the contract
and was known to the other party. Finally, wide acceptance of the
doctrine that a defendant is entitled to relief for mistake even in
collateral matters and even in the absence of knowledge4 9 makes it
equally impossible logically to refuse to grant rescission for mistake
induced by sharp practice. 0 In cases of mistake even unknown to the
other party, rescission has been granted in the past ten years in three
jurisdictions, 51 and during this period no case has denied rescission
for such a mistake. If the enforcement of contracts made by mistake
is disallowed, it should logically follow that it will no longer be
possible to refuse rescission when the contract, and therefore the mistake, was induced by sharp practice.
In England the traditional doctrine seems to have been repudiated
by the Law of Property Act of 1925, which provides in section 49(2)
that where specific performance is denied the court may authorize return of the deposit. This provision constitutes a denial of what had
been assumed for nearly two hundred and fifty years to be the right to
recover whatever damages might be proved, in cases in which a request
for specific performance had been denied upon grounds of unfair
conduct less than actual fraud. There would obviously be no reason to
return the deposit unless the contract was terminated by the decree.
The editors of the 1952 edition of Kerr on Fraudand Mistake consider
See cases cited note 19 supra.
50 A recent case emphasizes the similarity between seeking enforcement of a contract
made by mistake and of one induced by sharp practice in the contractual negotiations.
Elsinore Union Elem. School Dist. v. Kastorff, 54 Cal. 2d 380, 389, 353 P.2d 713, 718-19,
6 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6-7 (1960) (denying enforcement at law or in equity). In Townshend v.
Stangroom, 6 Ves. Jr. 329, 31 Eng. Rep. 1076 (Ch. 1801), Lord Eldon said:
[I]n a moral view there is very little difference between calling for the execution
of an agreement obtained by fraud, which creates a surprise upon the other party,
and desiring the execution of an agreement, which can be demonstrated to have
been obtained by surprise.
Id. at 337, 81 Eng. Rep. at 1079.
51 Board of Educ. v. Hooper, 850 S.W.2d 629 (Ky. 1961); Brooks v. Towson Realty,
Inc., 223 Md. 61, 162 A.2d 431 (1960); McClure v. Rignanese, 25 App. Div. 2d 565, 267
N.YS.2d 940 (2d Dep't 1966).
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the effect of the statute to be the elimination of any practical difference
between refusal of specific performance and rescission.5 2 The traditional distinction, despite its frequent repetition by judges in earlier
times and by Commonwealth decisions and English textwriters down
to contemporary times, 5 3 has received in recent years little judicial support in England. Since 1788 there have been many instances of decrees
52 W. KERR, FRAUD AND MISTAKE 582 (7th ed. 1952). It seems probable that § 49(2) of
the Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, was merely declaratory of a doctrine
that had long been recognized at common law. There is no evidence that the distinction
between denial of specific performance because of unfair conduct of the plaintiff and rescission had ever been law in England. Since 1751 the courts have set aside deeds and have
rescinded contracts, subject to equitable restitution of benefits, for unconscionable conduct
falling short of actual fraud. In Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sr. 125, 156, 28 Eng. Rep. 82,
100 (Ch. 1751), Lord Hardwicke annulled a bond which had been delivered in settlement
of a catching bargain with an heir, which the court described as "taking surreptitious
advantage of the weakness or necessity of another." Other decisions to the same effect are
Talbot v. Staniforth, 1 J. & H. 484, 70 Eng. Rep. 837 (Ch. 1861); St. Albyn v. Harding, 27
Beav. 11, 54 Eng. Rep. 5 (Rolls Ct. 1857); Evans v. Llewellin, 1 Cox 333, 29 Eng. Rep. 1191
(Ch. 1787); Gwynne v. Heaton, 1 Bro. C.C. 1, 28 Eng. Rep. 949 (Ch. 1778). See also O'Rorke
v. Bolingbroke, 2 App. Cas. 814 (1877) (dicta); Shelly v. Nash, 3 Madd. 232, 56 Eng.
Rep. 494 (Ch. 1818) (dicta). It is stated in R. GoFF & G. JONES, REsrrruTxoN 169 (1966),
that "[i]f the court decides that a bargain is unconscionable, it will be set aside only on
equitable terms." E. SNELL, PINCInLES OF EQUITY 614 (26th ed. 1966), says that unfair
bargains "made by poor and ignorant persons acting without independent advice will be
set aside in equity . . . "' The statement in the same edition, at 664, to the effect that
equity will in such cases deny specific performance without rescinding the contract, a
statement which is precisely to the contrary, has been supported by only a single case.
McColl-Frontenac Oil Co. v. Saulnier, [1949] 3 D.L.R. 208. Lord Eldon's remark in
Townshend v. Stangroom, 6 Ves. Jr. 328, 31 Eng. Rep. 1076 (Ch. 1801), that a court of
equity will sometimes deny specific performance under circumstances in which damages
may be granted, was made in a case in which the plaintiff requested specific performance
and the defendant successfully pleaded, as a defense, that he had made the contract
under a mistake as to the quantity of land to be included in a lease. No sharp practice
in obtaining the contract was alleged or proved. The same failure to distinguish between
denial of specific performance and damages, which has been preserved by the editors of
the twenty-sixth edition of SNELL, supra, was present in the fourth edition, published in
1878, several years after Snell's death. In the fourth edition, at 453, the statement appears
that in unfair practice cases involving persons under undue lethargy or excitement from
liquor, specific performance will be denied but the parties will be left to their remedies
at law. In the paragraph immediately preceeding, at 452, the statement is made that
wherever there is not entire good faith, the contract will be set aside in equity in contracts with persons non compos mentis. In another contemporary English textbook, J.
SmrrH, EQurry JuRsPRuDENacE 73 (13th ed. 1880), published only two years later, situations
in which one party has dealt unfairly with the other are included in the author's treatment of actual fraud, which is ground for avoidance of the contract. There is no reference in Smith's treatise to leaving the parties to their remedy at law.
53 McColl-Frontenac Oil Co. v. Saulnier, [1949] 3 D.L.R. 208; Jericho v. Guglielimin,
[1938] S. Austl. 292 (misunderstanding of agreement); Richardson v. Otto, 31 Queensl.
15 (1936); Summers v. Cocks, 40 Commw. L.R. 321 (1927) (Austl.); Vivers v. Tuck, 4 N.S.W.
14 (1863) (defendant illiterate and had been drinking); SNELL, supra note 52, at 664.
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for rescission of contracts induced by unfair means falling short of
actual fraud. 54 In a recent Irish case 55 specific performance was denied
on the ground of the plaintiff's unconscionable conduct. The court did
not grant rescission because such relief had not been requested, but
refused damages to the plaintiff even though, as the court expressly
pointed out, there had been no proof of actual fraud. It is stated in
the twenty-sixth edition of Snell's Principles of Equity that unfair bargains "made by poor and ignorant persons acting without independent
56
advice will be set aside in equity ....
The abolition of the distinction has been urged by high authority.
Lord Denning has said that "[i]f good faith is required in a person who
gives a promise, so it should be in a person who takes the benefit of it.
He should not enforce it in circumstances which it was never intended
to cover."5 7 Dawson has expressed the view:
This double standard of morality is a clumsy and ineffective way
of alleviating hardship or discouraging sharp bargainers, if the
contract whose enforcement in equity is refused is left open for enforcement by way of damage remedy. It is in fact surprising that
the special scruples shown in administering equitable relief should
have lasted so long after our chancellors had laid aside their ecclesiastical robes....
The interesting question is whether we . . . have become
prisoners of our own system-or, more accurately, whether we
55
have become confused by our lack of system.
One of the most forceful criticisms of the historic distinction was
advanced by Chafee in 1950:
54 M'Diarmid v. M'Diarmid, 3 Bli. N.S. 874, 4 Eng. Rep. 1373 (H.L. 1828) (man 83
years old); Dunnage v. White, 1 Swan. 137, 36 Eng. Rep. 329 (Ch. 1818) (person was not
drunk but was addicted to liquor); Mortlock v. Buller, 10 Ves. Jr. 292, 32 Eng. Rep. 857
(Ch. 1804) (intoxication); Townshend v. Stangroom, 6 Ves. Jr. 328, 28 Eng. Rep. 82 (Ch.
1801); Twining v. Morrice, 2 Bro. C.C. 826, 29 Eng. Rep. 182 (Ch. 1788); Evans v.
Llewellin, 1 Cox 333, 29 Eng. Rep. 1191 (Ch. 1787) (sale set aside; the vendor was poor
and ignorant, and taken by surprise with no time for deliberation); Cory v. Cory, 1 Ves.
Sr. 19, 27 Eng. Rep. 864 (Ch. 1747) (drunkenness); Ellard v. Lord Llandaff, 1 Ball & B.
241 (Ir. Ch. 1810) (ignorance).
In Popham v. Brooke, 5 Russ. 8, 38 Eng. Rep. 930 (Rolls Ct. 1828), an annuity for life
was offered to a surgeon on condition that he would live with grantor for remainder of
grantor's life. The surgeon knew grantor had only a few weeks to live. He died within
three months. The contract was rescinded.
55 Buckley v. Irwin, [1960] N. Ir. L.R. 98, 105 (Ch.).
56 E. SNELL, PRINCIPLES OF EQuITY 614 (26th ed. 1966); cf. id. at 664.
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105 (1953).

Dawson, Specific Performance in Franceand Germany, 57 MIcu. L. Rav. 495, 535-87
(1959) (footnotes omitted).
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Now that law and equity are merged, has not the time come to
abandon this double standard for land contracts? Why should the
same judges be very moral in a specific performance suit and
brutally mathematical in a damage suit? ...
For the most part, if a contract is too unfair to be specifically
performed, then it is too unfair for damages. At least, the single
court of today ought to take the facts which bar specific performance and ask whether they do not also render damages unjust....
[T]he main point [is] that, when unfairness is imputed to an agreement, judges ought to do plenty of thinking before they allow
damages to be awarded.
No doubt there will still be a few situations where unfairness
ought to prevent specific performance without preventing damages.
The distinction, however, ought not to depend on the old line
between law and equity or on varying degrees of morality....
... Suits for breach of contract involve morality, within the
proper limits of its application in a courthouse, just as much as
suits for specific performance. 59
Throughout the civil law and in the Scandinavian and Hungarian
legal systems, the contract is rescinded whenever it was obtained by
unfair means. 60
The doctrine that draws a distinction between standards of proper
conduct at law and in equity is an invitation to engage in sharp
practices under a guaranty of immunity from judicial interference if
the scoundrel confines his request for enforcement to damages. It is to
repeat a commonplace to state that legal standards establish criteria
of proper conduct even outside the law. An insidious by-product of
the traditional distinction is that it encourages, in the multitude of
transactions that never reach the courts, practices that are condemned
in all systems of ethics and morals, and in almost all legal systems except our own, and in some areas of our own legal system. 6' If the dual
standard has ceased to exist, we are doing the law and society a disservice by refusing to recognize its demise.
59

Z. CMFFE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITy 28-30 (1950).

R. NEWMAN, EQUITY AND LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 97-107 (1961).
61 Of course, sharp practices are condemned in some areas of our common law system;
e.g., actions for breach of trust, violation of fiduciary and confidential relationships, quasi
contractual obligations, and such special relationships as in Garrett v. Moore-McCormack
Co., 817 US. 289 (1942) (admiralty claims); Columbia Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Black, 85 F.2d
571 (10th Cir. 1929) (insurance contracts); Marks v. Gates, 154 F. 481 (9th Cir. 1907) (compromise settlements); In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 258 F. Supp. 864 (EJD. Pa. 1966) (bank60

ruptcy).

